The Impact of Parasitic DC And AC Sources on the Security of the KLJN Secure Key Exchange Scheme by Melhem, Mutaz Yousef
THE IMPACT OF PARASITIC DC AND AC SOURCES ON THE SECURITY 




Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Chair of Committee, Laszlo B. Kish
Committee Members, Robert S. Balog
Jun Zou
Andreas Klappenecker
Head of Department, Miroslav Begovic
May 2021
Major Subject: Electrical Engineering






The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) scheme is a statistical-physical secure key 
exchange system based on the laws of classical statistical physics to provide unconditional 
security. This dissertation contains four interrelated studies of the security of the KLJN 
system. 
 
In the first study, a new attack against the KLJN key distribution system is explored. The 
attack is based on utilizing a parasitic voltage-source in the loop. Relevant situations often 
exist in the low-frequency limit in practical systems, especially when the communication 
is over a distance or between different units within an instrument, due to a ground loop 
and/or electromagnetic interference (EMI). The study investigates the DC ground loop 
situation when no AC or EMI effects are present. Surprisingly, the usual current/voltage 
comparison-based defense method that exposes active attacks or parasitic features (such 
as wire resistance based information leaks) does not work here. The attack is successfully 
demonstrated and we proposed defense methods against the attack as shown. 
 
The second study investigates the security of the KLJN key distribution system with 
unknown parasitic DC-voltage sources at both Al work is the 
generalization of our earlier investigation with a single-end parasitic source. Similarly to 
the first study, the defense method based on comparing current/voltage data at Alice's and 




Under the assumption that Eve does not know the values of the parasitic sources, a new 
attack, utilizing the current generated by the parasitic DC-voltage sources, is introduced. 
The attack is mathematically analyzed and demonstrated by computer simulations. Some 
defense methods against the attack are shown.   
 
The third study addresses a new question regarding the security of the KLJN scheme 
compromised by DC sources at Alice and Bob: What is the impact of these parasitic 
sources on active attacks, such as the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, or the current 
injection attack? The surprising answer is that the parasitic DC sources actually increase 
the security of the system because, in the case of the MITM attack, they make it easier to 
uncover the eavesdropping. In some of the cases Eve can fix this deficiency but then the 
problem gets reduced to the original MITM attack to which the KLJN scheme is immune, 
as it is already proven earlier. 
 
In the last section a new attack against the KLJN secure key exchange scheme is 
introduced. The attack exploits a parasitic/periodic AC voltage-
(EMI). In the low-frequency limit, the procedure is the generalized form of the former DC 
ground loop-based attack. In the high-frequency case, the spectrum of the wire voltage is 
utilized. The attack is demonstrated in both the low and the high-frequency situations. 
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T Temperature 
MITM Man-in-the-Middle-Attack  
MHz Mega Hertz 
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EMI  Electromagnetic Interference  
BEP Bit Exchange Period 
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U(t) The Voltage on The Wire 
IDC The DC Component of the Current on The Wire 
In (t) The AC (noise) Component 
ix
The Voltage Noise Source of the Chosen Resistor 
The Votlage Noise of the Chosen Resistor
The Spectral Power Density of the Voltage in The Wire
The Spectral Power Density of the Current on The Wire
T The Common Temperature
k
RA
RB The Actually Connected 
The (Thermal) Noise Voltage Generator for when RA =RH
The (Thermal) Noise Voltage Generator for when RA =RL
The (Thermal) Noise Voltage Generator for when RB =RH
The (Thermal) Noise Voltage Generator for when RB =RL
The DC 
The Threshold Voltage
The Correct Guessing Probability
The Effective Voltage
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-Loop-Current Attack Against the
Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson- *. The paper was 
accepted and published by the Applied Sciences journal in 2019.
1.1. On Secure Communications
Communications systems, standards, and technologies have been developed since ancient 
times. Today we have the internet, Internet-of-Things (IoT), fourth generation wireless 
networks (LTE), and the expected fifth generation wireless networks. An important 
requirement of any communication paradigm is to accomplish secure communication, i.e., 
achieve the security of transferred data which can contain sensitive information (e.g., bank 
account credentials, social security number, etc.) it is of utmost importance to defend 
against attacks. These attacks might be launched by an eavesdropper (Eve) who has access 
to the information channel between the communicating parties A (Alice) and B (Bob). 
*Reprinted with permission from "A Static-loop-current Attack Against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise
(KLJN) Secure Key Exchange System." by Mutaz Melhem, and Laszlo Kish (2019). Applied Sciences 9.4:




The attack is passive if it eavesdrops without disturbing channel. The attack is active 
(invasive) if Eve disturbs or changes the channel, such as with a Man-in-the-Middle Attack 
(MITM). 
 
1.1.1. Secure Key Exchange  
 
Secure communication systems employ ciphers to encrypt messages (plaintext) and to 
decrypt encrypted messages (cyphertext). While the creation of a secure and efficient 
cipher is a complex problem, this problem may be solved simply. Ciphers operate with 
secure keys that form a momentary shared secret between Alice and Bob. Sharing 
(exchanging) the key securely is the difficult task. The security of the key exchange can 
be conditional or information-theoretic (unconditional). 
 
1.1.2.  Conditional Security 
 
Conditionally secure key exchange systems are the most common in the existing cyber 
systems. They are software protocols installed at Alice and Bob. Such algorithms utilize 
computational complexity, achieving only conditional security (see e.g., [1,2]). The 
system is temporarily secure provided the adversary has limited computational resources. 
A major goal of quantum computer developments is to crack these types of key exchange 
systems (e.g., the Shor algorithm). From an information-theoretic point of view, security 




a long time to do that unless she has a quantum computer or a yet-to-be-discovered 
classical algorithm that can do the job in a short time. The security is not future-proof. 
 
1.1.3. Unconditional (Information-Theoretic) Security  
 
In order to achieve unconditional (information-theoretic) security [3,4] at the key 
exchange, proper laws of physics with a special hardware are utilized. Two major classes 
of physics-based schemes have emerged for unconditional security:  
  
(i) Quantum key distribution (QKD) [5,6] concepts assume single photons and utilize 
and the related quantum no-cloning theorem [7]. Even though there are serious debates 
about the actual level of unconditional security a practical QKD can offer (see e.g., [8
43]), most scientists agree that QKD is unique in its offering information-theoretic security 
via (a dark) optical fiber and also through air at night, provided the visibility is good [44-
47].  
 
(ii) The second major class is the KLJN key distribution method based on the statistical 
physical features of the thermal noise of resistors [48 64]. The related law of physics is 
the fluctuation-dissipation-theorem (FDT). The scheme has a wide range of applications 
[65-78], and has three distinct advantages among many: It works via wire connections 




[65,66] to connect homes and other establishments. It can be integrated on a chip, which 
implies excellent robustness, low price, and applicability in bankcards, computers, 
instruments, and physical unclonable function (PUF) hardware keys [67,68]. Its low price 
allows general applications, such as unconditional security for the control of autonomous 
vehicular networks [69,70].  
 
1.2. On the KLJN Secure Key Distribution  
 
The KLJN scheme [48 64] utilizes the thermal noise of resistors (or the emulation of that 
by a specific hardware). In the core scheme Alice and Bob have two identical pairs of 
resistors, RL and RH (RL < RH), respectively (see Figure 1). The key exchange protocol of 
a single secure bit is as follows: Alice and Bob randomly pick one of their resistors (RL or 
RH), connect it to the wire channel, and keep them there during the bit exchange period 
while they execute voltage and/or current measurements to learn the resistor value at the 
other end. The noise voltage generators shown in Figure 1 with each resistor can be the 
common noise-temperature that is publicly agreed. The power density spectra of the 
voltage and current in the channel are given by the Johnson-Nyquist formulas [48]: 
 




           (2) 
 
 where  is the Bol is the common temperature, and  and are 
the actually connected  
After the measurement and spectral analysis, Equations (1) and (2) have 
two unknown variables, namely, the values of   and , and thus Eve can find the values 
of the connected resistors, but not necessarily their locations, by solving these equations. 
We can represent the four different situations of the connected resistors (  and/or ) at 
Alice's and Bob's ends by the indices of the connected resistors, LL, LH, HL, and HH, 
respectively. As all the resistors have the same (noise) temperature, the ideal system is in 
thermal equilibrium, where the second law of thermodynamics guarantees zero net power-
flow. Hence, Eve cannot use the evaluation of power flow to determine the locations of 
the momentarily connected resistors unless they have the same resistance values. On the 
other hand, Alice and Bob can determine the connected resistor values by using Equations 
(1) or (2) since they know the value of their own connected resistors. When , which 










Figure 1. The core of the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) system. 
, , , and U
LBn
(t)  are the (thermal) noise voltage generators 
for the related resistances  and , respectively. and  are the 
measured noise voltage and the current in the wire that are used to evaluate the 
power density spectra  and , respectively. 
 
1.3. On Former Attacks against the KLJN Secure Key Distribution 
 
Several attacks [79-91] have been proposed but no attack has been able to compromise 
the unconditional security of the KLJN scheme because each known attack can 
efficiently be nullified by a corresponding defense scheme. 
 
The attacks can be categorized into two classes: 
 
(i) Passive attacks that utilize the non-ideal or parasitic features in a practical KLJN 




threat, and the most efficient attack is power balance measurement (Second Law Attack) 
[80]. An efficient defense is based on a proper temperature-offset [80,81]. Temperature-
inaccuracies [82] and resistance-inaccuracies [83] can also cause information leaks. On 
the other hand, these inaccuracies can compensate for each other [50] if used in a creative 
way. Non-zero cable capacitance [84] or cable inductance can also yield information leaks 
that can be fixed by specific designs including the proper choice of frequency range and 
privacy amplification. Transients can also be utilized for attack [85], but there are various 
means of defense against these [51,86]. The newest KLJN system, the random-resistor-
random-temperature KLJN (RRRT-KLJN) scheme [52], is robust against the above 
vulnerabilities, or at least, no known attack exists against it yet. For other passive attacks 
the reader can refer to [87,88]. 
 
(ii) Active attacks are where Eve either modifies the information channel, or she injects an 
extra current into it. Current injection attacks [48,89] and MITM attacks [90] are examples 
which have been explored [91]. Due to the current and voltage comparison [90] feature 
and its more advanced cable-modeling version [89], active attacks are, so far, the least 
efficient attacks against the KLJN scheme.  
 
(iii) Flawed attacks are some proposed attack methods that are based on misconceptions, 
and they do not work. For examples, see their brief summary and criticism in papers [85-





1.4. Dissertation Focus 
 
The research in this thesis explores new passive-attack schemes that exploit the existence 
of parasitic sources in a KLJN communication channel. The sources can be DC or AC, 
and they can be caused by ground loops, electromagnetic interference, or any imbalance 
between the two ends of the communication. Such sources can potentially leak 
information from the KLJN system.  
 
In the first two studies, we propose attacks that exploit the existence of a parasitic DC 
source  or two DC sources  in a practical KLJN system. The DC source is usually a 
DC ground loop [97-99]. We simulated both types of attacks and proposed techniques to 
defend against them.  
 
In the third study, we are studying the security of a KLJN system spoiled by two DC 
sources against the classical (MITM) and current-injection attacks [100].  
 
Finally, in the fourth study, we propose a new attack that exploits the information leak 
resulting from an AC source located on one side of a KLJN system [101]. The attack is 
successfully demonstrated and shown to be easily defensible. The conclusion 




The importance of this research is to aid the development and design of KLJN systems 
against these novel passive-attack schemes. Also, it uncovers major system constraints 
that must be satisfied for the practical implementation of a KLJN system.  
2. A LOOP-CURRENT ATTACK BASED ON HAVING A DC VOLTAGE
SOURCE AT EITHER *
2.1. Introduction 
The study in this section is also i -Loop-Current Attack 
Against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson- [97].
The paper was accepted and published by the Applied Sciences journal  in 2019.
In practical KLJN systems, in order to save a wire, the common end of the resistors (see 
Figure 1) is often connected to the ground. In practical situations there is often an 
imbalance, a voltage difference between various locations of the ground that is due, for 
example, to ground loop currents or electromagnetic interference (EMI) [92]. This 
potential information leak was pointed out in [92] as a potential source of information 
leaks in the case of significant cable resistance. However, it was not realized in [92] that 
information leaks can exist even at zero cable resistance. The present study is directly 
relevant for DC current-based ground loops (such as during secure communication 
between different units in instruments [67,68]). 
*Reprinted with permission from "A Static-Loop-Current Attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise 
9.4:666, © [2019] by Melhem and Kish. 
10




For EMI-induced ground loops, our DC-limited study is only a first step in addressing a 
more general situation (which should be investigated in future works). 
 
In this section, we explore this new information leak in the DC parasitic voltage limit. 
Hence, consideration was given to situations where during the bit exchange period, the 
relative change in the parasitic voltage is small. For the sake of simplicity but without the 
limitation of generality, we assume that the imperfection is represented by a positive DC 
 
 
Due to Kerckhoff's principle of security, that is, the assumption that the enemy knows 
everything except the momentary key, we must assume that Eve knows the polarity and 
value of this DC voltage (If she does not know it at first, she will be able to extract it via 
long-time averaging). The direction of the current I(t) is assumed to point from Alice to 
Bob. The voltage U(t) and current I(t) in the wire contain the sum of a DC component and 









Figure 2. The KLJN system under study, where  and , are 
the noises belonging to the randomly chosen resistors,  and  , of Alice and 
Bob, respectively, is the DC voltage source and  and are the voltage and 
current on the wire, respectively. 
  














in which  and , with  and , are the voltage 
noise sources of the chosen resistors,  and , respectively. 
 
 








where and  represent the DC and AC voltage components in the wire, 







The DC component is different during Alice's and Bob's LH and HL bit situations of 
secure bit exchange, which yields information leaks. In the LH situation, that is, when 














For later usage, we evaluate the average of  and  and call this quantity the 






The effective (RMS) amplitude  of the noise voltage on the wire is identical in both 




Note that the voltage and current noises in the wire follow a normal distribution since the 
addition of normally distributed signals results in a signal that has normal (Gaussian) 
distribution with a corresponding mean (see Equation 10) and variance.  
 
For an illustration of the information leak, (see Figure 3). The DC component, that is, the 
mean value of the resulting (AC + DC) Gaussian depends on the bit situation during the 
secure key exchange. This dependence poses as a source of information for Eve about the 
secret key. This feature will be exploited below for the new attack scheme. 
 
2.2. The Attack Scheme 
 





(i) Measurement: During a single secure bit exchange, Eve measures N independent 
samples of the wire voltage. 
 





where  is the number of samples that are above . 
 
(iii) Guessing (based on Equations (9) (14)): For  and , Eve's guesses are the 
 and bit situations, respectively. For , her decision is undetermined and 
carries no useful information. 
 






where  is the total number of guess bits, and  is the number of correctly guessed 
bits. The situation  indicates perfect security against Eve's attack. 
 
In the next section, we demonstrate the attack method via computer simulation. 
 
 
Figure 3.  
 
2.3. Simulation Results 
 
To test Eve's correct guessing probability p  for the LH situation, we assumed that Alice 
and Bob selected  and R
H
10 k . During these experiments, the DC voltage 




white Gaussian noise function (wgn) from the Matlab communication system toolbox to 
test the success statistics of the attack scheme while varying the temperature.   
The effective bandwidth  and the range of temperatures were 1 MHz and 
, respectively. At lower temperatures  was 1, within the statistical 
inaccuracy of simulations; at the high-temperature limit it converged to 0.5.  
 
We tested secure key length M = 700 bits at different bit exchange durations represented 
by sample/bit numbers N = 1000, 500, and 200, respectively. Figure 4 shows Eve's correct 
guessing probability ( ) of a key bit versus temperature. With temperature approaching 
infinity, the effective noise voltage on the wire also approaches infinity and the Gaussian 
density function is symmetrically distributed around the threshold voltage . Thus, the 
probabilities of finding the noise amplitude above or below  are identical (0.5). 






Figure 4. Eve's correct guessing probability (p) of key bits versus temperatures at 
bandwidth equals 106 Hz, for key length 700 bits, and duration/bit (number of 
samples/bit) 200, 500, and 1000, respectively. The limit p = 0.5 stands for perfect 
security. 
 
The observed dependence can be interpreted by the behavior of the error function (see also 











The noise in the KLJN scheme is a bandlimited white noise, and thus, in accordance with 




Therefore, when temperature T is converging towards infinity, p converges to the perfect 
security limit of 0.5 (see Figure 4). 
 
2.4. Some of the Possible Defense Techniques against the Attack 
 
Based on the considerations above, the impact of the attack can be eliminated by various 
means. The most natural ways are:  
 
(i) Cancelling the effect of the DC-voltage sources. For example, Bob can use a variable 






(ii) Alice and Bob can increase the effective temperature, that is, the amplitudes of their 
noise generators (see Equation (18) and Figure 4). 
 
(iii) Alice and Bob can increase the bandwidth to increase the effective value of the noise 
(see Equations (18) and (20)). However, the bandwidth must stay below the wave limit 




3. GENERALIZED DC LOOP CURRENT ATTACK AGAINST THE KLJN
SECURE KEY EXCHANGE SCHEME*
Generalized DC Loop Current 
Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange [98]. The paper was accepted and
published by the journal Metrology and Measurement Systems.
In the present section, we study the generalized and most common practical situation of 
parasitic DC loop current by adding an arbitrary second generator, assuming that there 
was not yet enough time for Eve to utilize Kerckhoffs's principle of security [91]. We will 
show that Eve's job is much more complicated to attack the compromised system by two
unknown DC voltage generators of arbitrary polarity that are located at Alice's and Bob's 
sides (see Figure 5).
* Reprinted with permission from "A Static-Loop-Current Attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise
(KLJN) Secure Key Exchange System." by Mutaz Melhem, and Laszlo Kish (2019). Metrology and 





Figure 5. The KLJN system in the generalized ground loop situation  &  are 









} . &  are the ground loop DC voltage sources, and  &  
are the wire voltage and wire current, respectively. 
 
3.1. The Generalized DC Ground Loop Situation 
 
As a preparation, we introduce the mathematical notations that are similar but more 
complex than in [97]. Both the voltage  and current  in the wire have a DC and 
a stochastic AC (that is, noise) components (see Figure 5). The direction of the current 
 is assumed to point from Alice to Bob. Then the current in the wire can be expressed 
as: 
 
  ,  (19) 
 









        (21) 
 
Here  and  are the effective (rms) values of the Johnson noise voltage sources 
with  and  (either physical thermal noise or external generators representing 
enhanced effective temperature [48,53,86,91]) with  and
  
 






From (3) and (6) we obtain: 
 
   (23) 
 
Where  and U
ACw






   (24)  
 
From Equation 24, it is obvious that a non-zero information leak occurs since the DC 
components are different in the LH and the HL bit case. Specifically, at the LH situation, 
that is, when  and  
 
                                  (25)     
 
while in the HL bit situation it is: 
 
  (26) 
 
For later usage, we evaluate the average of the above-defined  and , and call 
this quantity threshold voltage, : 





Moreover, we compare Equations (25) and (26) to obtain the following inequality: 
 
  if  (28) 
 
The noise component  of  (see Figure 5) can be written as: 
 
   (29) 
 
From (21) and (29): 
 
    (30) 
 
Obviously,  has normal distribution, since it is the linear combination of 
Gaussian noises and DC values, and their power spectral density is the same in both the 
LH and HL cases [97]. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the different situations of the wire voltage 
 versus the threshold voltage , when  and  . This 
behavior of the wire voltage is exploited in our new attack scheme to distinguish the LH 






Figure 6. Eves' threshold scheme to guess the bit situation LH vs. HL when  , 
and the   and  parasitic DC voltages are assumed positive for the purpose of 
illustration.  and  
respectively, and U
th
 is their mean.  
 
   
Figure 7. Eves' threshold scheme to guess the bit situation LH vs. HL when  , 









3.2. Eve Estimates the Values of the Ground-Loop Voltages 
 
The first step in our attack scheme is to compare the values of  and  . Our 
assumption is that Eve originally does not know the values of the parasitic voltage sources, 
so first we introduce a technique to measure  and  , respectively. From 
Equation (6), we can express  as: 
 
   (31) 
 
The above equation is useful to Eve in the LL and HH situations, where she knows the 
connected resistors, including  (see [97]).  and  are measurable, and even 
though she does not know the instantaneous signal of , she can use time averaging 
to produce: 
 
         (32) 
 
Where  represents the time average over a time period . If  is long enough, the 
AC components will converge to zero.  From  (16) we get: 
 
                                                                                          (33) 
 
29
For finite time averages, the estimation of has error because the convergence
to zero is incomplete. We will call this error . Following the same procedure for
:
(34)
We call the error of this estimation . Knowing the resistance values in the LL and HH
situations, Eve can estimate the values of  and from (33) and (34),
respectively. Equation (29) and condition imply that the noise voltage on the
wire and and are higher in the HH situation than in the LL situation. Accordingly,
Eve should use the LL situation to estimate and .
3.3. On the Attack
3.3.1. The Attack Scheme
After Eve estimates and , she conducts four more steps:
i) Comparison of the DC voltages: Eve uses the extracted and U
DCB
values to
determine whether the DC voltage component in the wire is higher during the LH or the 
30
HL bit situation (see (28)). Then Eve designs the guessing protocol discussed below.
ii) Measurement: During the bit exchange period (BEP), independent samples of the
wire voltage are recorded by Eve. 
iii) Evaluation: Similarly to the procedure in [97], Eve calculates the ratio 
where is the number of points above and is the total number of samples.
iv) Guessing [based on (25-30)]: For , Eve's guess is LH if .
Conversely, her guess is HL when . For and , her guess is 
, and it is when . Regardless of the values of and ,
decision is undetermined when .
Eve's probability p of correct guessing of a bit is the ratio of the number of correctly 
guessed bits to the total number of guessed bits , [97]. The p  0.5
situation indicates the perfect security limit [99]. 
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3.3.2. Can Eve Use the DC Current, Instead of the DC Voltage, in Her
Scheme?
To comply with the mathematical notations used in Section 2, and denote the DC 
current in the wire; and and the noise (AC) components, at the HL and 
LH bit situations, respectively. Following the voltage-based scheme, the threshold current 
is the average between and . and 
are equal; hence, . Also, and have the same rms values. 
Therefore, there is no difference in the measured values that Eve could utilize for an attack. 
3.3.3. Impact of the Difference between and on the A Success
Here we show that the efficiency of the attack depends on the difference between the 
parasitic DC voltages and not on their specific values. If and U
DCB
are both shifted
by the same value then , , and are also shifted by ; see the illustration
in Figs. 8 and 9. Thus, only the difference of these voltages determines the





Figure 8.  Illustration of the DC voltage components in the LH and HL situations before 
and after a  shift in the parasitic voltages, where  ;  ; and
 and  are the resulting DC voltages in the LH and HL situations, respectively.  
is the average of  and  . 
 




Eve's correct bit guessing probability  was evaluated analytically and tested by computer 
simulations (see Figure 9).  
 
For the analytic evaluation we used the error function: 
  









  .               (36) 
 
And  is the effective (rms) value of the noise voltage  on the wire. 
 
In accordance to the analysis described in Section 4.3, the results were always identical 
when the difference  was the fixed, regardless of the values of  and 
. This fact confirms our theoretical result Section 4.3 that the success of the attack 
depends on the difference of parasitic DC sources only, and not on their actual values.  
   
Computer simulations were carried out with  = 0.1V and 0.2V. During these 
tests,  and  were fixed to and , respectively. The length of the key was 
700 bits. The duration of each BEP was 500 samples (time steps).  
 








Figure 9.  Eve's correct bit guessing probability ( ) versus temperatures at differences of 
a) 0.1V and b) 0.2V, at various effective noise temperatures, with bandwidth ( ) of 
1MHz. At the computer simulations the key length was 700 bits with 500 independent 
time samples/bit. The asymptote, , represents perfect security. The evaluation was 









3.5. Defense Methods  
 
The attack can be countered using the same defense techniques as described in the 
previous section, namely, cancelling the DC voltages or by increasing the effective (rms) 
value of noises by increasing the noise temperature and/or the bandwidth (without 
exceeding the wave limit [48,91,95]). All methods are the same as those discussed in [97], 
except for the DC voltages cancellation techniques in which the defense can be conducted 
in two other ways: 
 
i) Adding variable DC-voltage sources at each side and tuning them to compensate out the 
parasitic sources, or alternatively tuning them to reach .  
 
ii) Naturally, a simplified version would work as well: Adding a single variable DC 
voltage at one side and tuning it to reach  yielding zero DC loop current. 
 
iii) Attaching a capacitor in series to 
ends to eliminate DC current in the wire. Note, this maneuver requires great precautions 
because of its impact on line impedance and the potential information leak. 
 
4. MAN IN THE MIDDLE AND CURRENT INJECTION ATTACKS AGAINST
THE KLJN KEY EXCHANGER COMPROMISED BY DC SOURCES*
Man in the Middle and Current 
Injection Attacks against the KLJN Key Exchanger Compromised by DC Sources [100].
The paper was accepted for publication in the journal Fluctuation and Noise Letters.
4.1. Introduction
In this section, we study a new situation that is combined of former attack 
features, which are MITM [90] and the current injection attacks [48,89]
operating in the presence of parasitic voltage sources (such as ground loop) [97-
99] in the wire channel. The question here is whether that the two former
compromising factors synergistically help Eve to crack the system? We will see 
that the opposite is true in the MITM attack: The combined factors make it 
more difficult for Eve to keep her operation covert. 
*Reprinted with permission from " Man in the Middle and Current Injection Attacks against the KLJN 
publication in Fluctuations and Noise Letters (2020).
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 4.2. Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks at Parasitic DC Sources 
 
In [90], three different versions of the MITM attack were proposed: 
 
(i) By inserting KLJN circuitries ide , (see Fig. 10). The 
defense against this attack was the communication of measured instantaneous current  
values by Alice and Bob via an authenticated public channel. The noise currents at Alice 
and Bob become independent during the attack thus the eavesdropping is discovered 
instantaneously with very high probability [90]. 
 
(ii) By inserting twin noise current generators, (see Fig. 12);  
 
(iii) By inserting twin noise voltage generators, (see Fig. 12).  
 
Below we prove that the KLJN system compromised by parasitic DC sources [97-99] is 
not only secure against these attacks, but, in their original form, some of these attacks help 








4.2.1. MITM Attack by Inserted KLJN Circuitries 
 
It is obvious from the analysis of the circuitry in Fig.10 that whenever the parasitic DC 
sources of and  are sufficiently different, Alice and Bob can use changes in the 
DC current to discover Eve. Then the DC situation will also change during the attack, and 
if the difference is greater than the rms value of the AC component of the wire voltage, 
Alice and Bob can successfully use simple time average to distinguish between the attack 
and no-attack situations. The original loop is broken in two separate loops thus the 
resultant DC loop voltage will be different in both new loops leading to different DC 
currents. Thus Alice and Bob can discover the attack even without comparing their 
instantaneous currents. The DC current they measure will change due to the attack thus 
they can discover Eve without even communicating with the other party. Hence, Alice and 
Bob need only to do a simple time averaging to uncover the attack. 
 
Fig. 11 shows an improved MITM attack with inserted KLJN circuitries. By adding the 
proper DC voltage generators matching the situations at Alice's and Bob's ends, Eve's 
imitation of Alice and Bob is improved and Eve can stay hidden with the same probability 
as at the original MITM attack situation [90] because the DC current components at the 
two ends will remain the same. The defense against this attack is identical to the original 
protocol [90]. Thus, it requires the measurement and communication of measured 
instantaneous current values by Alice and Bob via an authenticated public channel. The 




attack. Thus, the eavesdropping is discovered instantaneously with very high probability. 
Mathematically speaking, the probability that Eve can stay hidden decays exponentially 
with time, and it is in the order of 10-20 over the bit exchange period at practical conditions 
[90].   
 
 
Figure 10.  Using the original [90] MITM attack. Eve cuts the wire and attaches two 
Thus two independent KLJN loops are created. Both communicators are identical with the 
communicators of Alice and Bob (except for the parasitic voltages). Even though Eve's 
noise voltage generators  and  have identical spectrum as the noise 
generators of Alice and Bob, their time functions are statistically independent.  and 
  and B ( )U t  are 
values, Alice and Bob can discover the attack quickly [90]. However, they can do that 
even without measuring the instantaneous currents: The DC current in their own loop will 
change due to the attack.  They can then discover Eve without communicating with the 







Figure 11.   Improved MITM attack with inserted KLJN circuitries. By adding the proper 
DC voltage generators Eve's imitation of Alice and Bob is improved and Eve can stay 
hidden with the same probability as in the original MITM attack. 
 
4.2.2. MITM Attack by Inserting Twin Noise Current Generators 
 
The man-in-the-middle attack with twin noise current generators, (see Fig. 12), is the same 
as in the original MITM situation [90]. Even though Eve's injected currents are identical 
with  amplitude, due to Ohm's law, the instantaneous voltages  and  will 
be different most of the time because of the independence of the noise voltage generators 
of Alice and Bob, similar to the original situation [90]. Thus, Alice and Bob can quickly 
discover Eve by comparing their instantaneous voltage measurement data. 
 
However, similar to the scheme described in Section 2.1, whenever the parasitic DC 
sources of and  are sufficiently different, the DC voltage situation in the wire 
will also change during the attack, and if the difference is greater than the rms value of the 




average over the bit exchange period to distinguish between the attack and no-attack 
situations. Here, Eve's solution (shown in Fig. 11) to fix this problem does not work 
because adding a voltage generator in serial to the current generators will obviously not 
change the voltage and current values in the loop. Thus the existence of the ground loop 
ultimately makes Eve's situation worse. 
 
 
Figure 12.  The man-in-the-middle attack with twin noise current generators  of 
identical amplitudes [90]. Alice and Bub can compare the instantaneous voltage values 
via an authenticated public channel or, whenever the parasitic DC voltages are sufficiently 
different, utilize simple time averaging to uncover the attack. 
 
4.2.3. MITM Attack by Inserting Twin Noise Voltage Generators 
 
The man-in-the-middle attack with twin noise voltage generators, (see Fig. 13), is the same 
as in the original MITM situation [90]. Even though Eve's injected currents are identical 
with  amplitude, due to Ohm's law, the instantaneous currents  and  will 




Alice and Bob, similarly to the original situation [90]. Thus Alice and Bob can quickly 
discover Eve by comparing their instantaneous voltage measurement data [90]. 
 
However, similar to the scheme described in Section 2.1, whenever the parasitic DC 
sources of and  are sufficiently different, the DC current situation in the wire 
will also change during the attack and, if the difference is greater than the rms value of the 
AC component of the wire current, Alice and Bob can successfully use simple time 




Figure 13.  The man-in-the-middle attack with twin noise voltage generators  of 
identical amplitudes. For other definitions, see the captions of Fig. 1 and Fig. 10. Alice 
and Bob can discover the attack even without comparing their instantaneous currents. 
The DC current in their loop will change due to the attack. Thus, they can discover 






Fig. 14 shows a somewhat improved attack where Eve is attempting to compensate the 
DC voltage differences at the two ends by forcing a proper DC voltage component on the 
wire. However, she can do this deterministically only during emulating the HH or LL 
situation when the DC voltage on the wire is the average of the parasitic DC voltage 
components of the two ends. At these situations the bits are discarded. Thus, Eve does not 
gain any advantage. 
 
In the secure (LH and HL) cases, Eve has only 0.5 success probability to eliminate the DC 
problem. For example, toward Bob, she can fix the DC voltage to imitate the DC voltage 
drop at the LH situation and wait until Bob randomly chooses the H resistor. The problem 
with this approach is that, if Bob chooses L instead, he will detect that the DC voltage is 
the wrong value. Thus, this attack improvement is strongly limited as works only in half 
of the cases. Thus, Alice and Bob can discover the attack, on the average, in two secure 
bit exchange periods even without public communications. 
 
On the other hand, the original defense method [90], that is the public comparison of the 
instantaneous voltage measurement data of Alice and Bob, always uncovers Eve with very 
high probability in a very short time. Her probability to be able to stay hidden decays 








Figure 14.   Improved twin voltage generator attack. By adding the proper DC voltage 
generators, Eve's imitation of Alice and Bob is improved, and Eve can stay hidden with 
the same probability as in the original situation. 
 
4.3. Current Injection Attack at Parasitic DC Sources 
 
During the current injection attack [48,89,93] (See Fig. 15), Eve injects a small noise 
current in the line and measures the cross-correlation of this current with the current in the 
wire. Due to Kirchhoff's node law, the cross-correlation is greater at that side of the attack 
point where the resistance is lower because the injected current is distributed according to 
the conductance of the terminations of the wire. The efficient defense against this attack 
is the comparison of instantaneous current amplitudes by Alice and Bob, which were 
formerly proposed [48], analyzed [12,93], and tested [56]. The goal of our current study 
is to clarify the following questions: 
 
(a)  Does Eve has any advantage or disadvantage from the parasitic DC sources and the 




 (b)  Does the former defense protocol [48,89,93] still work? 
 
The answers to the above questions are straightforward:  
 
(i)  The parasitic DC current is a DC current component. Thus, it is statistically 
independent from the AC current components (including Eve's ones) in the wire. Thus 
the parasitic DC currents have zero contribution to Eve's cross-correlation 
measurement. Moreover, by using a current generator, Eve can conduct the same 
attack, without any advantage or disadvantage, as earlier. 
 
(ii)  If Alice and Bob compare the instantaneous current amplitudes of the AC components 












Figure 15.   The current injection attack against the KLJN scheme, where  is the 
injected current. For other definitions, see the captions of Fig.1 and Fig. 10. The 
existence of DC sources does not influence the distribution of injected AC currents. 
Thus, the setup level remains the same as without them. Alice and Bob discover the 
attack by comparing their instantaneous AC current amplitude. 
 
In conclusion, the parasitic DC sources do not influence the current injection attack and 
its defense
5. AC LOOP CURRENT ATTACKS AGAINST THE KLJN SECURE KEY
EXCHANGE SCHEME*
AC Loop Current Attacks against 
the KLJN Secure Key Exchange Scheme [101]. The paper was submitted for 
publication in the Computers and Electrical Engineering (Elsevier).
5.1. Introduction
As a significant enhancement of DC loop voltage and current attacks, in this section, we 
explore the situation of periodic AC voltage sources in the loop. This situation is very 
common at long-range secure communications. Thus, it must be taken very seriously. 
We show that the new attack requires different procedures in the high and low frequency 
limits.
*This section is a modified version of the paper, "AC Loop Current Attacks against the KLJN Secure Key 
was submitted to Fluctuation and Noise letters (2020).
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5.2. The AC Ground Loop Current Situation 
 
In the next sections, the security of the KLJN is studied when a single periodic AC source 
AAC ( )U t  is located at one of the communicating parties, see Figure 2, where  is a 
periodic AC time function. Such situations exist due to AC ground loop and/or 
electromagnetic interference (EMI) from motors, power supplies, wireless networks, etc. 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the AC source is present only 
terminal.  
 
The voltage on the wire (see Figure 16) can be given as:  
 
   (37) 
 
where  and  are the standard voltage noise sources 
of the chosen resistors,  and , and  and  are the periodic (parasitic) 










U(t) and I(t) are the voltage and current on/in the wire, respectively.  is the AC 
ground loop voltage source.  are the randomly chosen resistances by 
Alice and Bob, respectively.  and  are the voltage noise 
sources affiliated with , respectively.  is the periodic voltage component on 
the wire and AC ( )I t  is the periodic current component in the wire. n ( )U t  and  are the 
fundamental noise voltage and current components in the wire, respectively. 
 
The periodic component can be written as (see Figure 16): 
 
 ,     (38) 







Figure 17. Illustration of the AC component of the voltage on the wire  in the (a) 
LH situation (b) HL situation (c) LL situation and (d) HH situation when  and 
  (see Equation 40). 
 
The noise component of the voltage on the wire, as given earlier [51,91,98]: 
 
            (39) 
 











5.3. The AC Loop Current Attacks 
  
The attack protocol depends on the  ratio where  is the frequency of the periodic 
source and  is the frequency of the bit exchange. Below, we describe two protocols for 
different frequency limits. 
 
5.3.1. Attack in the Low-Frequency Limit  
 
 If the frequency of the periodic source  is less than the bit exchange (clock) frequency 
 Eve can attack the secure bit exchange if she knows the time function  of the 
periodic source. The attack has the same basic steps as the DC attack procedure described 
in [97,98]: 
 
(i) Measurement: Eve measures and records N independent samples of the voltage U(t) on 
the wire during the bit exchange period, where the sampling rate is determined by the 
Nyquist sampling theorem and it is double the noise bandwidth.  
 
(ii) Evaluation:  Eve calculates a quantity  defined as: 
 




where  is the number of samples that are above a threshold voltage  which is fixed 
during the i-th bit exchange period. The new aspect of the low-frequency AC attacks, 
compared to the DC attacks [97,98], is that,here, the threshold Uth,i varies between bit 
exchange periods. The actual threshold  is the time average of the periodic component 
over the i-th bit exchange period: 
 
 ,        (41)
    
where  is the end of the i-th bit exchange period, and  is the duration of the 
bit exchange periods. Note, in this new situation, the threshold is not always positive.  
 
(iii) Guessing:  
 
Eve's guess of the secure resistor situation is: 
 
 - LH when ; or  ,           (42) 








 If  , the bit will be discarded (as undetermined).                                               (44) 
 For  , the bit will be discarded (as undetermined).                (45) 
 
5.3.2. Attack in the High-Frequency Limit  
 
In the high frequency limit, the previous attack procedure does not work. Our proposed 
attack is executed in the spectral domain. We assume Eve knows the frequency of the 
periodic source.  
 
The attack protocol in the high frequency limit consists of three phases: 
 
(i) Preparation phase: As preparation for the attack, Eve is running computer 
simulations of the KLJN system. She can do that because in accordance with the 
Kerckhoffs's principle [8,91] of unconditional security Eve supposedly knows all the 
details of protocol and hardware except the actual secure key. 
 
(a) From the computer simulations she obtains the simulated voltages on the wire, 
specifically, the total voltage , its noise component  and its AC component 
. Then, from these time functions she calculates the squared absolute values of their 
Fourier transforms over each bit exchange periods:  | N
s




respectively, the simulated signals are shown in Figure 18. From these spectra, she 
calculates:  
 
(b) The "simulated noise-background",  , which is the ensemble average of 
simulated  spectra over a large number, M, of LH and HL bit exchange 
periods. (Note, in accordance with the KLJN protocol (see Section 1.1) using only LH or 
only HL periods would result in the same values provided the KLJN system is ideal). 
 
(c) The " , that is defined as:  
 
      (46) 
 
where  and  are spectral averages over the frequency: 
they are the average of the  function over the noise bandwidth W , in the LH 
and HL situations, respectively. Note, the LH and HL cases are different for the AC 
component due to the voltage division factor of the different resistance values (RL vs RH) 
at the two parties. 
 
(ii) Measurement phase: At the i-th bit exchange period, Eve measures the voltage Ui(t) 




background  from  to estimate the actual  , and 
computes its spectral average : 
     
    ,    (47) 
 
which is scaling with the mean-square of the AC voltage component on the wire during 
the i-th bit exchange period. 
 
(iii) Guessing phase: Eve compares  with the AC threshold  
. Based on this comparison, she guesses the actual secure resistor situation as: 
 
-LH when        (48) 
 






Figure 18. The square absolute value of the Fourier transform of simulated voltage 
components: (a) that of the voltage on the wire: ; (b) that of the AC component: 
; (c) that of the noise voltage component ; (d) that of the estimated AC
component . The simulation was conducted with sinusoidal periodic 
source of frequency =1kHz, and the clock (bit exchange) frequency =500 Hz. The 
noise bandwidth =100kHz, the effective noise temperature is K, while  and  
are 1  and 10 , respectively.  
 
5.4. Demonstration of the Attacks 
 
To evaluate the success of the attacks, we ran simulations in both the low and high 




where  is the number of the successfully guesses, and  is the total number of 




During the simulations, , , , and  were , ,  and 100 kHz, 
respectively. The length of the key was 1000 bits. We chose  
where the frequency fA of the periodic component was varied.  
 
The noise generation is described below. 
 
5.4.1. Generating the Johnson Noise 
 
MATLAB was used to generate the Gaussian Band-Limited White Noise (GBWN). 
Significant efforts were made to improve Gaussianity, reduce bias, and avoid any aliasing 
error which are typical weaknesses in computer simulations. At first, using the MATLAB 
randn() function,  or 16,777,216 Gaussian random numbers were generated. Next the 
noise was converted from the time domain to the frequency domain using the MATLAB 
FFT function, and, to get rid of any aliasing error, we increased the sampled bandwidth 
by zero padding. The real component of the inverse FFT resulted in a GBWN noise with 
Nyquist sampling rate and reduced aliasing errors. The final step was to scale the noise 
amplitude to the physical effective value by the Johnson formula (see Equation 37) at 
known resistance, temperature and bandwidth.  
 






5.4.2. Demonstration of the Attack in the Low-Frequency Limit  
 
Tests utilizing Equations 42-47 and computer simulations were conducted at different 
periodic frequencies in the low-frequency limit, 1 kHz = fC >> fA  =318.3, 101.32 and 32.25 
Hz, with , see Figure 4. By varying the noise temperature Teff 
(see Equation 37) the effective noise voltage Ueff on the wire (see Equation 37) ranged 
from 0.01 to 100 Vrms. Figure 4 shows the probability p of correct guessing of the bit 
versus the effective value  the KLJN noise voltage on the wire. Similarly to the DC 
loop current attacks in [97,98], at low Ueff values compared to the amplitude of the periodic 
component, the system is highly vulnerable (p=1) while at high  values the system is 









 Figure 19. The correct guessing probability p vs the effective noise voltage Ueff on the 
wire. The noise bandwidth  is 100 kHz, the clock (bit exchange) frequency  is 1 kHz, 
the key length is 1000, and the frequency of the sinusoidal source  is 318.30, 101.32 
and 32.25 Hz and its amplitude is . 
 
5.4.3. Demonstration of the Attack in the High-Frequency Limit 
 
For the given periodic AC signal, the Fourier transform was obtained using fast the Fourier 
transform (FFT) protocol. The tests were conducted under the same conditions as in 
Section 4.2, except the periodic frequency  was set  to 2, 16, and 32 kHz, and the bit 
exchange (clock) frequency  -guessing 
probability  with respect to the KLJN noise voltage Ueff on the wire (controlled by the 
varying noise temperature Teff, see Equation 37) . Similarly to the DC loop current attacks 
in [97, 98], at low Ueff values compared to the amplitude of the periodic component, the 




( p=0.5 ). The change from vulnerability to security takes place at a higher  values 
for higher fA frequencies. See Figure 20. 
 
 
Figure 20. The probability p of correct guessing vs the effective noise voltage Ueff on the 
wire. The noise bandwidth  is 100 kHz, the clock frequency  is 500 Hz, the key length 
is 1000, and the frequency of the periodic sinusoidal source  is 2, 16, and 32 kHz. 
 
5.5. Defense against the Attacks 
 
The attack can be defended using the similar defense techniques mentioned in [97, 98]: 
i) Elimination of the parasitic sources. 
 





iii) Increasing the effective voltage of the noise on the wire (that is increasing the noise 
temperature Teff) to approach the limit of perfect security.  
 






The KLJN secure key exchange scheme is a statistical physical system that offers 
unconditional (information-theoretic) security. For a detailed survey and its history, see a
more detailed explanation in [91].
* Part of this section is reprinted with permission from "A Static-loop-current Attack Against the Kirchhoff-
Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange System." by Mutaz Melhem, and Laszlo B. Kish (2019). 
Applied Sciences 9.4: 666, © [2019] by Melhem and Kish. 
* Part of this section is a modified version of the paper "A Generalized DC Loop-Current Attack Against
the (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange System." by Mutaz Melhem, and Laszlo Kish, (2020). Metrolo. Meas. 
Syst 26.4: 617, © [2019] by Melhem and Kish. 
* Part of this section is a modified version of the paper "Man in the middle and current injection attacks
against the KLJN key exchanger compromised by DC sources." by Mutaz Melhem., and Laszlo Kish, 
(2020). arxiv, © [2020] by Melhem and Kish. 
* Part of this section is a modified version of the paper "AC Loop Current Attacks The KLJN Secure Key
Exchange Scheme." by Mutaz Melhem, Christiana Chamon, Shahriar Ferdous, and Laszlo Kish, (2020). 
arxiv, © [2020] by Melhem, Chamon, Ferdous, and Kish.
_____________________________
In Section 2, a novel attack against the KLJN protocol was introduced using a frequently 
occurring parasitic feature, namely the imbalance of voltages between the ground points at 
the two ends. We showed that, in the DC limit, such parasite voltages and currents could 
cause information leaks. The present study is directly relevant for DC current-based 
ground loops (for example, during secure communication between different units in 
instruments [67,68]). The attack was demonstrated via computer simulation and proper 
defense protocols were shown to eliminate the information leak. Our DC-limited study is 
only a first step in addressing a more general situation that is investigated in section 3. 
Section 3 generalizes the DC loop current attack introduced in  Section 2. The generalized 
scheme makes Eve's work easier. We provided a mathematical analysis and verified the 
attacks analytically and by computer simulations. We also proposed effective defense 
techniques.
In conclusion, in practical KLJN key exchangers, Alice and Bob must carry out DC loop
current tests before and during operation and act accordingly (see Section 3.6).
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It is important to note that the general, more expensive defense method of KLJN, which
is based on in-situ system simulation and comparison with measurements (see Section 4.1 
in [89]), works efficiently because such a defense technique alerts for any deviation from 
the idealized situation, including parasitic DC voltages and currents.
In section 4, we proved that a practical KLJN system that is possibly compromised by 
parasitic serial DC sources remains secure against the MITM attacks and the current 
injection attack. In each case, Eve's probability of success to stay hidden is less or equal 
to the idealistic situation with no parasitic sources [90]. Thus launching these attacks 
against the KLJN scheme remains non-feasible.
Section 5 introduced a novel attack against the KLJN secure key exchange. The attack 
addressed the situation when there is a single parasitic AC source at side of Alice. Such 
situation could exist due to AC ground loops, and electromagnetic interference (EMI) 
from power motors, power supplies, wireless networks; etc.
At low-frequency disturbance, the attack follows a generalized procedure of the earlier 
DC attack in [98]. 
At high-frequency disturbance, the attack is based on frequency analysis, separating the 
periodic component and the utilizing the same threshold crossing statistics as in [97,98].
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The vulnerability of the KLJN scheme against these attacks was successfully 
demonstrated by computer simulations. An important implication is that, when the KLJN 
system is working in the "stealth" mode, where the natural thermal noise voltages of the 
resistors are used and the periodic component cannot be over-powered by artificial noise 
generators at the resistors, a strong effort must be made to eliminate any periodic 
component from the loop otherwise significant information leak can be present during 
these attacks.
Finally, we listed available defense methods against these attacks. A practical KLJN 
secure key exchanger must also be armed against these new types of attacks, too.
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